Ambient EMF Encryption (AEE)
A Novel Framework for Physical-Layer Cryptographic Key Generation
The first formal framework for deriving encryption keys from ambient electromagnetic fields. Featuring Diffraction Grating Cryptography (DGC) — quantum-resistant encryption through geometric EMF modulation with $100 in commodity materials. 571 experimental replicates. Open source.
Abstract
This research presents Ambient EMF Encryption (AEE), a novel cryptographic framework that derives encryption keys from the manipulation and measurement of ambient electromagnetic fields. We introduce three novel contributions: (1) AEE as the first formal framework for using ambient EMF as a cryptographic entropy source, (2) Positionally-Relative EMF Keys (PREKs) that are inherently bound to physical location and time, and (3) Diffraction Grating Cryptography (DGC) as a proof-of-concept achieving quantum resistance through geometric EMF modulation.
Experimental validation across 571 replicates and 26 configurations demonstrates non-commutative layer stacking (A∘B ≠ B∘A, p < 0.001), +98.7% detection increase with optimal stacking, and 84% RF attenuation through color filters (p = 0.0034). The system provides a key space of ~10²⁴ static configurations expandable to 10^86400 with dynamic reconfiguration.
Keywords: Physical-layer encryption, ambient EMF, quantum-resistant cryptography, diffraction grating, physically unclonable functions, information-theoretic security, Shannon's perfect secrecy, non-commutative operations
1. The Problem: Quantum Threatens Everything
Modern encryption systems — RSA-2048, ECC-256, and even post-quantum algorithms — rely on computational hardness assumptions that will be invalidated by large-scale quantum computers. Shor's algorithm can factor large integers in polynomial time, rendering current public-key infrastructure obsolete.
Post-quantum cryptography (NIST standards) still depends on mathematical hardness. If a future algorithm breaks the underlying problem, the encryption fails retroactively.
Quantum computers will shatter RSA and ECC. The "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" threat is already active.
The Core Vulnerability
Every computational cryptosystem shares the same weakness: security depends on no one finding an efficient algorithm. This is an assumption, not a guarantee. Physical layer encryption eliminates this dependency entirely.
1.1 Existing Physical Approaches Fall Short
- Quantum Key Distribution (QKD): Achieves information-theoretic security but requires $10,000+ specialized hardware and dedicated fiber infrastructure
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs): Provide device-unique signatures but operate in the digital domain and are vulnerable to ML characterization over time
- Geo-Encryption (Scott & Denning, 2003): Uses GPS as input parameter — spoofable and not entropy-based
1.2 Our Contribution
We propose a fundamentally different approach: encryption keys derived from the physical manipulation of ambient electromagnetic fields. Security comes from physical measurement impossibility (Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle), not computational hardness. There is no mathematical problem for quantum computers to solve.
2. Three Novel Contributions
Each represents a first-of-its-kind advance in physical-layer cryptography.
Ambient EMF Encryption framework: Environmental entropy → Copper tube resonator → Cryptographic key output
1. Ambient EMF Encryption (AEE)
The first formal framework for using ambient electromagnetic fields as a cryptographic entropy source. Unlike Intel RDRAND (internal thermal noise) or Cloudflare LavaRand (centralized visual entropy), AEE is inherently location-bound and environmentally dynamic.
The ambient EMF environment at any physical location is unique, time-varying, and unmeasurable remotely with sufficient precision to reconstruct keys.
2. Positionally-Relative EMF Keys (PREKs)
Cryptographic keys inherently bound to physical location and time. PREKs cannot be generated remotely because they depend on the specific ambient EMF environment at the point of creation.
Moving the system even meters changes the ambient field, producing different keys. This creates location-based authentication without GPS.
3. Diffraction Grating Cryptography (DGC)
Proof-of-concept implementation achieving quantum resistance through geometric EMF modulation. Uses optical diffraction gratings on a copper tube cavity resonator to create pattern-dependent electromagnetic signatures with up to 52.4% signal variation.
Key space: ~10²⁴ static configurations. With dynamic reconfiguration (1 change/second): 10^86400 per day.
3. System Architecture
Exploded view: Diffraction gratings, copper tube cavity resonator, and HackRF SDR transceivers — ~$100 total
Copper Tube Cavity Resonator
Electromagnetic waveguide and resonant cavity with four side holes (A-D), top end aperture for grating attachment, bottom capped. Creates standing wave patterns determined by tube dimensions, aperture geometry, and frequency (924 MHz optimized).
Diffraction Gratings
Optical diffraction gratings with geometric patterns (hearts for curved apertures, stars for angular apertures) attached magnetically to top aperture. Magnetic attachment enables dynamic reconfiguration — physically swapping gratings changes the encryption key.
Software-Defined Radio (HackRF One)
Transmitter and receiver operating at 924 MHz with 2 MSPS sample rate, TX/RX gains of 20 dB. Generates test signals and measures pattern-dependent electromagnetic signatures with high precision.
Key Space Composition
| Variable | Range | Contribution |
|---|---|---|
| Grating Patterns | 10+ | Hearts, stars, circles, custom designs |
| Layer Count | 1-4 | Stacked configurations |
| Layer Order | n! | Non-commutative (A∘B ≠ B∘A) |
| Spacing Precision | 0.1mm | Over 10mm range |
| Rotation | 1° | Over 360° |
| Position | 4 | Aperture locations A-D |
Total Static Configurations: ~10²⁴
With Dynamic Reconfiguration (1 change/sec): 10^86400 per day
4. Experimental Results
Empirical validation at 924 MHz across 571 replicates and 26 configurations in ambient (non-Faraday cage) conditions.
Non-commutativity demonstrated: Reversing layer order produces statistically significant signal differences (p < 0.001)
4.1 Pattern-Dependent Signal Variation
| Pattern | Detection Rate | Peak Power | Behavior |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline (No Grating) | 100% | 0 dB | Reference measurement |
| Hearts (Curved) | 150.1% | +2.8 dB | Signal spreading, enhanced coupling (+50.1%) |
| Stars (Angular) | 147% | +3.17 dB | Energy concentration, focused beam (+47%) |
4.2 Non-Commutative Layer Stacking
Key Discovery: Order Matters (p < 0.001)
Layer stacking order produces statistically significant differences in electromagnetic signatures:
- Stack A (Hearts→Stars): +47% detection increase vs baseline
- Stack B (Stars→Hearts): +98.7% detection increase vs baseline
- Difference: 8.4% detection variation, 6.25 dB peak power difference between reversed sequences
This non-commutativity (A∘B ≠ B∘A) is cryptographically significant — it means layer ordering acts as an additional key dimension that cannot be brute-forced by trying patterns individually.
4.3 Color Filter RF Attenuation
Unexpected Finding: Optical Filters Affect RF (p = 0.0034)
Color filters designed for visible light attenuate RF signals by 84% at 924 MHz. This suggests the thin-film coatings interact with electromagnetic waves across a broader spectrum than their optical design intent — opening additional key space dimensions.
5. Security Properties
Why this system resists quantum computing, machine learning, and physical cloning.
Physical layer encryption vs computational cryptography: fundamentally different security models
| Attack Vector | Computational Crypto | AEE / DGC |
|---|---|---|
| Quantum Computing | ✘ Shor's algorithm breaks RSA/ECC | ✔ No computational problem to solve |
| Machine Learning | ✘ Patterns learnable from ciphertext | ✔ Features unmeasurable remotely |
| Physical Cloning | N/A (software-only) | ✔ Sub-mm precision + ambient EMF required |
| Future Algorithms | ✘ Unknown attacks may emerge | ✔ Physical laws don't change |
Information-Theoretic Security (Shannon's Perfect Secrecy)
The security model is: Security = f(physical law constraints)
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (Δx·Δp ≥ ℏ/2) prevents exact measurement of grating configurations. The act of measuring the system disturbs it. This is not an engineering limitation — it is a fundamental law of physics.
6. Distinguished from Prior Work
Competitive landscape: AEE occupies the unique position of decentralized + dynamic entropy at commodity cost
| Prior Work | Approach | AEE Distinction |
|---|---|---|
| Geo-Encryption (Scott & Denning, 2003) | GPS as input parameter | Uses EMF as entropy source, not coordinates |
| Cloudflare LavaRand | Centralized visual entropy | Decentralized and location-bound |
| Intel RDRAND | Internal thermal noise | External environmental EMF |
| Physical Unclonable Functions | Static device signatures | Dynamic ambient entropy |
| Quantum Key Distribution | $10,000+ specialized hardware | $100 commodity materials |
7. Data Availability
The complete dataset (571 replicates, 26 configurations), data dictionary, all figures, and the full research paper are available on Zenodo under CC BY 4.0.
This is an open source defensive publication to establish prior art and prevent patent trolling. Anyone may use this technology with attribution.
Citation
@article{omori2026aee,
title={Ambient EMF Encryption (AEE): A Novel Framework for
Physical-Layer Cryptographic Key Generation},
author={Omori, Hana},
journal={Zenodo},
year={2026},
doi={10.5281/zenodo.17983036}
}
